Vilnius - the “historic summit” that wasn’t

Vilnius - the “historic summit” that wasn’t 

New Europe 29-Nov-13 

The Vilnius summit between the EU and the six Eastern Partnership countries has started with the participants signing impressively long documents: the technical part of initialing the agreements took hours, the documents signed by Moldova and Georgia with the EU having both more than 900 pages, with each page being signed by all sides. 

The Association Agreement that Ukraine should have signed on Friday morning, 29 November, would have been even loger: 1200 pages. 

The paradox of the Vilnius summit is that, in spite of the EU Commission’s Jose Manuel Barroso’s bombastic habit of calling any such event “historic”, this summit with six poor former Soviet countries would have been practically ignored without the EU’s arm wrestling with Russia over Ukraine. 

After six years of negotiating with the EU, Ukraine should have signed an association agreement that it initialed in March 2012, but it abruptly shelved it at Putin’s personal request, as disclosed by both Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich and the prime minister Mykola Azarov. 

EU Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle, present in Vilnius, is quoted as having given Ukraine until Friday morning to decide whether it will still sign the Association Agreement. “Yes, we still hope that the agreement will be signed”, said Füle, although there is little hope of this happening. Ukraine’s premier Mykola Azarov has already admitted that the government ditched the agreement under Russian pressure: “The Russian government made it clear to us that signing such an agreement means it would be impossible to discuss trade and economic relations”. 

In his turn, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has before the summit blamed both Russia and the EU for his failure to sign the agreement. He said that Russian President Putin threatened to bankrupt factories in eastern Ukraine if he signed the EU pact. In an interview with the German paper Die Welt on the eve of the summit, Yushchenko even called Ukraine’s treaty on gas import from Russia the “greatest tragedy in Ukrainian politics”. 

Ukraine pays a higher price to Moscow for gas than Germany or Poland and it already owes Russia 22 billion dollars. Twice, in 2006 and 2009, Russia cut its gas supplies to Ukraine, disturbing gas deliveries all across Eastern Europe. With one quarter of its exports going to Russia, the corrupt, tightly knit Yanukovich government didn’t want to risk a new confrontation at the start of winter. 

But, while calling Russia’s attitude towards Ukraine a form of colonialism and “an invitation to slavery”, Yushchenko also criticised Europe’s insistence on the freeing of the jailed former premier Yulia Tymoshenko. 

It is understood that the EU committed a strategic mistake by focusing too much on the Tymoshenko case and on what is called “selective justice”. EU officials have brought no clear proof that Tymoshenko’s trial had been flawed or unfair; they only spoke vaguely about “selective justice”, irritating even pro-Europeans inside Ukraine, many of whom have their own ideas about Tymoshenko’s degree of innocence. 

The forced low-key Vilnius summit exposes a serious reversal for the EU’s own policy towards its Eastern, former Communist neighbours. The EU perspectives have always been formulated in a long term perspective and in a much too technocratic way to deeply appeal to a political class that continues to thrive in Kremlin’s shadow. EU has tried the same uniform, technical approach to all its neighbours. All had to apply the same criteria and to submit themselves to the same “benchmarks”. 

In the absence of a concrete agreement with Ukraine, the EU is thus trumping up relations with the small, enfeebled Eastern Partnership countries Moldova and Georgia. On top of initializing agreements similar to the one that Ukraine should have signed, Moldova got reassurances that visa requirements would be lifted for its citizens, while Georgia is signing a supplementary agreement allowing it to participate in EU crisis management missions. Azerbaijan will also sign an agreement to facilitate visa deliveries. 

The remaining two Eastern countries, Armenia and Bielorussia, are only figuring at the summit without signing anything. Both accepted to be part of Russia’s Customs Union with Central Asian countries Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, a decision which would make the signing of an agreement with the EU legally impossible. 

Meanwhile, even as the Vilnius summit is underway, protests continue in Kiev against the government’s decision not to sign the promised association agreement with the EU.

Hamas in disarray

Hamas in disarray 

THE JERUSALEM REPORT w/e 02-Dec-13

There is now a window of opportunity to exploit the organization’s weakness, Egypt’s goodwill and Tehran’s restraint to advance the peace negotiations 

A STRING of major regional developments over the past two years has left the Islamist Hamas government in Gaza in dire straits and opened up new opportunities for Israel and Palestinian moderates. 

In backing the Sunni rebels in the Syrian civil war, Hamas forfeited its special ties with its biggest arms supplier, Iran; the mili- tary ouster of its Muslim Brotherhood allies in Cairo put serious strains on its relations with Egypt; and a change of leadership in Qatar left a big question mark over the extent of financial aid from the oil-rich Gulf state it can continue to count on. 

The “axis of resistance” – Shi’ite Iran, Alawite Syria, Lebanese Shi’ite Hezbollah and the Sunni Hamas – survived until the beginning of the uprising in Syria, in 2011. As the civil war intensified, Hamas found its Sunni identity increasingly at odds with the non-Sunni axis to which it belonged. In December 2011, under strong external Sunni pressure, the Hamas leadership and all military operatives left Damascus and relocated to Gaza, Egypt, Qatar and Sudan. 

The fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt in February that year had opened the way for Hamas to return to the natural embrace of its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, the rising power in post-revolutionary Egypt. With the Brotherhood’s backing, they hoped to be able first to challenge the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority, and then Israel. At the same time, Hamas found a place in the Sunni coalition of Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia against the Assad regime in Damascus and its Iranian sponsor. 

The estrangement from Iran and Syria, however, came at a price. Military aid from Iran ground to a halt. Ghazi Hamad, the Hamas Deputy Foreign Minister, confirmed in May this year that relations with Iran were “bad” and that “for supporting the Syrian revolution, [Hamas] lost very much” in the field of military cooperation. 

Hamas had hoped that this strategic loss would be more than made up for by the new Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt. Initial signs were good. Although president Mohammed Morsi did not denounce the peace accords with Israel, he refused to deal directly with Israelis; moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme spiritual guide Sheikh Mohammed Badie called for “jihad to liberate Jerusalem from the Israeli occu- pation”; and during the IDF Operation Pillar of Defense in Gaza, in November 2012, Morsi’s prime minister Hesham Kandil made a solidarity visit to Gaza declaring, “The cause of Palestinians is the cause of all Arabs and Muslims.” 

However, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to deliver the goods. It failed to meet Gaza’s energy needs, and after 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed in Sinai by jihadist militants from Gaza in August 2012, Morsi’s Egypt closed down many of the Sinai-Gaza smug- gling tunnels, dealing a severe blow to the Gazan economy. Indeed, in late September, large protests in Gaza against rising prices of construction materials and fuel were direct- ed at Egypt as much as at Israel. Apart from symbolic support, Morsi was careful not to provide Hamas with any material aid or to threaten Israel with active Egyptian involve- ment – even during Israel’s Pillar of Defense operation against Gaza. 

Nevertheless, the military takeover in Egypt in early July left Hamas in a state of shock. The campaign against Hamas by the new military-backed government, the state media and public opinion intensified in pro- portion to the growing violence of Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations across Egypt. Egyptian state television accused Hamas of training people to undertake car-bombing operations and the leading Egyptian state paper, Al-Ahram, cited high-ranking security sources who accused Hamas of involvement in the abortive assassination attempt against Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim in September. 

Over the past three months the Egyptian army has destroyed most of the smuggling tunnels underneath the Sinai border with Gaza. For all intents and purposes, it has created a buffer zone by clearing buildings deemed a security threat up to one kilometer from the border. 

Egyptian military, economic and media pressure has also impacted on Hamas’s political standing. In August, a Gazan version of the Egyptian Tamarud – the rebel movement that led the popular protests against Morsi in the run-up to his removal by the military – began preparations for mass demonstra- tions against Hamas on November 11, the anniversary of former Fatah leader Yasser Arafat’s death. Over the past two months, Hamas security agencies arrested dozens of Fatah activists and journalists charged with belonging to Tamarud. 

MOREOVER, SAUDI Arabia, Kuwait and the Emirates support the Egyptian military crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood and show no inclination to help its Palestin- ian branch in Gaza. In September, Jordan too turned down a request from Hamas to reopen its offices in Amman. 

And in Qatar, which had supported Hamas with donations, grants and field projects (not cash) to compensate for the cessation of Iranian support, there was a change in leadership. In June, the emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani stepped aside for his son Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. The new ruler seems more likely to focus on domestic issues and will probably be more circumspect in his regional policies. There have already been reports of worsening ties between Hamas and Qatar – although senior Hamas officials deny this, and insist that Iran has not made a resumption of relations with Hamas conditional on its severing ties with Qatar. 

Hamas’s staunchest diplomatic supporter is Turkey, but when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan planned a high- profile solidarity visit to Gaza, he was barred by Egypt’s new rulers. 

Hamas is also challenged in the Palestinian arena by the strengthening of Palestinian Au thority President Mahmoud Abbas’s standing and the possibility of progress in the PA’s peace talks with Israel. This could lead it to attempt to sabotage the negotiations through major terrorist attacks in the West Bank or in Israel proper, or through a campaign of missile and rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. This could elicit popular Egyptian pressure on the military regime in Cairo to support Hamas in the event of a major Israeli retaliation. 

Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khaled Mashaal recently called for a unified Palestinian strategy to confront what he called “Israeli schemes of Judaization” in Jerusalem. This would be achieved by building an Arab, Islamic and Palestinian military cap bility to follow a widespread popular uprising designed to drain Israel on a daily basis. 

Hamas also keeps open the option of renewed fighting against Israel by strengthening its alliance with the Gaza Salafist groups. Contacts between Hamas and the Salafists over the past few months, mediated by clerics from Kuwait and the influential Egyptian religious leader Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, led to an agreement which reportedly grants the Salafists “freedom to operate in politics, the military arena, religious advocacy, as well as civil and social organizations.” In return, the Salafist factions “will commit to the cease-fire and other decisions made by the ruling Hamas movement.” Arrests and harassment of Salafists have ceased recently and many detainees have been released. 

Ali Baraka, the chief Hamas representative in Lebanon, recently summarized the organization’s strategy concerning relations with its former allies. The fact that Hamas and Iran differ over how best to achieve a peaceful settlement in Syria does not mean they differ on everything else, he said. Hamas and Iran share the same positions on a number of key issues, including standing “against Israel and Zionist actions in the Middle East.” And he added that Hamas hopes the Syrian crisis will come to an end soon and allow the restoration of “the axis of resistance,” which “was seriously damaged by the Arab Spring.” 

However, given Iran’s overtures to the West since Hassan Rouhani’s inauguration as president in August, Tehran will probably be very cautious in its regional conduct, especially towards a rogue organization like Hamas. 

I have long held that the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations have little chance of success as long as the PA does not rule Gaza. There is now a window of opportunity to exploit Hamas’s weakness, Egypt’s goodwill and Tehran’s restraint to advance the peace negotiations. 

The idea would be to impose PA control over Gaza, divide the Hamas movement by giving the more pragmatic Hamas leaders incentives to be part of a new joint regime, and by offering the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza better economic and territorial conditions in the short-term, and, in the long-term, a clear compromise acceptable to all parties. 

Dr. Ely Karmon is a senior research scholar at the Herzliya-based Interdisciplinary Center’s Institute for Counter-Terrorism

Seven killed as earthquake shakes Iran nuclear reactor

Seven killed as earthquake shakes Iran nuclear reactor 

Daily Telegraph 29-Nov-13 

At least seven people were killed in an earthquake in Iran on Thursday near the city of Bushehr, where the country's sole nuclear power plant is situated, state news agency IRNA reported. 

The earthquake, which had a magnitude of 5.6, struck about 40 miles (60 km) northeast of Bushehr on the Gulf coast, according to US Geological Survey data. No damage to the nuclear plant was reported. 

IRNA said seven people had died, and quoted the governor of Bushehr saying there was "total calm" in the area. Relief teams had been sent to the affected towns and villages, he said. 

Helicopters will be dispatched on Friday to assess the damage, said Fars news agency, which put the death toll slightly higher, at eight. 

Hossein Derakhshan, a spokesman for the Red Crescent, said there had been some damage to houses in the area because they were traditionally built and not earthquake-proof, according to news agency ISNA. 

When the quake struck at a depth of 10.2 miles earlier on Thursday, there were reports on social media in Saudi Arabia that it was felt in the kingdom's eastern province, across the Gulf from Iran. 

Iran sits on major geological faultlines and has suffered several big earthquakes in recent years. Less than one week ago, an earthquake measuring 5.4 in magnitude struck western Iran near its border with Iraq. 

The Iranian nuclear deal. Unlocking the Middle East

The Iranian nuclear deal. Unlocking the Middle East 

Economist w.e. 30-Nov-13 

Not only was the deal with Iran the best on offer, but it can transform the world’s most troubled region 

FOR over three decades Iran and America have been blood enemies. Their hatred, like the hatred between the Palestinians and the Israelis, has framed the Middle East’s alliances and fuelled terror and war. The interim deal over Iran’s nuclear programme has not undone that—far from it. But through the keyhole it offers a tantalising glimpse of a different, better Middle East. It is a vision worth striving for. 

Iran and six world powers, led by America, struck the six-month interim nuclear agreement in the early hours of November 24th (see article). Iran will cap its programme at more or less its capacity today, while the rest of the world will relax sanctions a little. But the deal matters mostly for what it heralds. If Iran shows restraint and the world rewards it, the negotiators might generate sufficient goodwill to reach a more durable and comprehensive agreement. And that would open up the possibility of America and Iran co-operating more, or at least feuding less, in the world’s most troubled region. 

Pure fantasy, say the Gulf Arab states and Israel (and its allies in Congress). Invoking Neville Chamberlain in Munich in 1938, they warn that the world is appeasing an aggressive and malign regime bent on a nuclear arsenal. During years of talks, Iran has earned a reputation for double-dealing. It is a sponsor of terror, Bashar Assad’s main backer in Syria and a mortal threat to Israel. The regime foments hatred of the Great Satan in Washington not by chance, but to justify its hold on power. 

The deal is thus a lousy one, argues Israel’s hawkish prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, because Iran will never honour it or negotiate a final agreement. America has rewarded a wicked regime at the expense of its allies. A tough line—sanctions and talk of an Israeli attack—brought Iran to the table; only a tougher one will get it to give up its programme. 

This newspaper sees it differently—in terms of both the risks and the rewards. Doing anything with Iran is a gamble, but in the short term there is not much for the West to lose. The big face-saving concession for Iran is that the regime is still permitted to continue enriching uranium. But the enrichment will be only to the 5% civilian level, and Iran has agreed to daily inspections of its nuclear facilities, to monitoring by cameras and to opening up more of its sites. If the regime makes a dash for a bomb, the world can find out soon enough to take action. If the talks break down, Iran will not be much closer to having a bomb than it is today—and further away than it would have been without a deal. 

And the pressure is still on the regime. If Iran cheats or cynically sabotages further talks, it will embarrass Russia and China, which have staked their credibility on the agreement; they might back more sanctions. Barack Obama has rightly retained the threat of military action if Iran goes back on its pledge not to acquire a bomb. By contrast there is much to gain from sticking to the deal and going further—not least for Iran itself. Although it has already won about $7 billion of sanctions relief, the remaining oil sanctions alone will cost it about $30 billion in the next six months, a big incentive to move on to a bigger deal. 

Whether it chooses to depends on Iran’s willingness to put its past as a pariah state behind it. It is here that the really big rewards begin. If ever there was a moment to test the idea that Iran is ready to change, it is now. The president, Hassan Rohani, was elected this summer on a wave of popular discontent towards the conservative establishment and the hardline policies of his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Young Iranians are disenchanted. The supreme leader, though a sworn enemy of America, has given Mr Rohani licence to talk to the West. Were Mr Rohani to conclude that the regime had more to gain from being part of the world rather than wholly against it, that would be a prize in itself. But even larger rewards would come if a less isolated Iran became more reasonable, too. 

Small chance, great prize 

Iran is a country 77m-strong with a rich imperial history: it is also the most important Shia Muslim power. If it changes its outlook, the whole of the Middle East will change with it. Imagine that Iran one day concluded that spreading mayhem ultimately tends to create trouble at home and began to view its neighbours in terms of opportunities rather than threats. That would do more for the security of Israel and Saudi Arabia than any number of weapons agreements. 

The immediate test, and opportunity, will be Syria. Without Iran, Mr Assad would have been ousted long ago. Now Iran is losing men and money there. It also shares, with America, a fear of the Sunni extremism flourishing in rebel-held areas. The West needs to accept that Iran must be at the table in the peace talks due in Geneva. If anybody can bully Mr Assad to offer concessions, it is Mr Rohani. And if Syria becomes even mildly more tranquil, it would calm its neighbours. 

In Lebanon, suppose that Iran ceases using Hizbullah, its proxy, as a constant threat to the country’s stability and to Israel. Or that Iran started to use its influence over the Shia population in Iraq to broker peace, rather than to sow discord. Even if Iran merely started to be less mischievous in Iraq (or for that matter in Bahrain, Palestine and Yemen), the Middle East would become a more stable place. All this would take time—after 34 years America and Iran have a lot of catching up to do. But it is worth remembering that they were once allies. 

Saudi Arabia and Israel are at once troubled by the prospect of a redeemed Iran and also convinced that the whole idea is a dangerous illusion. Yet the real fantasy is to imagine that more sanctions or harsher negotiations could have produced a deal that was much better than this one. The alternative was not for Iran to abandon its nuclear programme, but for America to abandon diplomacy—and prepare for an assault. 

Bombing would probably set Iran back by only a few years; but it would certainly remake the Middle East in a very different way. Nobody knows whether the gamble with Iran will pay off. But it is already clear that the risks are low, the prize is potentially vast—and the alternative is dire. 

Gospel of Matthew 12:1-32 Satan, Beelzebub and Demons,