The EU is taking over defence policy by stealth

The EU is taking over defence policy by stealth 

Daily Telegraph 08-Dec-13 

The European Common Security and Defence Policy is an attempt to protect Continental industrial interests from US competition 

The UK government likes to pretend that EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is harmless inter-government cooperation, which has no access to money, or legal sanctions, and is therefore a federalist paper tiger. These draft European Council Conclusions give the lie to that. Any Conservative prime minister should be wholly opposed to what these Conclusions so clearly intend. To sign the UK up to this programme is not just another step towards a Euro-Army, which has always been a dream of the federalist nations like Germany, but another blow to the UK’s already beleaguered defence industries, and another nail in the coffin of Nato, in order that Continental defence industries should not be exposed to US competition. 

Much of these draft Council Conclusions appears to be just verbiage – the usual high-flown rhetoric about the EU being a “global player” in defence, and about the “strong commitment for the further development of a credible and effective Common Security and Defence Policy”. The understatement that “defence budgets in Europe are constrained” is a feeble attempt to mask the reality that member states, including the UK, are all cutting their defence budgets. The oft repeated plea to “make use of synergies” to improve capabilities has so far proved a forlorn hope, and the invocation of “increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP” is bound to fail. It is almost entirely down to France and the UK that “EU defence” means anything at all – and we work increasingly bilaterally, or they are a Nato operation under an EU flag. Nato remains far more significant, because it has US backing and SHAPE (Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe) where people are practised at planning and generating force for multinational operations. But Nato only gets its first mention as a “partner” in Paragraph 6, alongside the UN, OSCE and the African Union, as though they were equivalent. There is mention of “strategic partners and partner countries”, but it is telling that the EU cannot bring itself to name the USA, the military entity which dominates the world and which is the sole guarantor of European security. This underlines the squeamishness, futility, parochialism and vanity of CSDP. 

However, the potential for to damage UK defence interests is in the detail. The call for “an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework”, and for “an EU Maritime Security Strategy”, both involve the federalist EU Commission. Remember, the Commission is the EU’s most powerful legislative body, so this is anything but intergovernmental cooperation. Agreeing to this is to agree to a threat to the independence of UK policy in these fields. The fact that the Council will also call for “increased synergies between CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors” opens the door to legally binding defence commitments “to tackle horizontal issues such as organized crime, including trafficking and smuggling of human beings, and terrorism” – another compelling reason for the UK to exercise its Lisbon Treaty opt-out from EU home and justice affairs entirely. 

Finally, on “military capability development”, the EU intends utterly to eclipse Nato, backed by the two legally binding 2009 Defence Procurement Directives, which enhance the power of the European Defence Agency (EDA). This is becoming an embryo EU defence ministry. EDA’s statute enables decisions to be taken by majority voting, and where any single state can threaten a veto, a subset of member states can act unilaterally as a bloc in the name of the whole of the EU (so called “structure cooperation”). 

However, EU Defence is not so much about defence, as protectionism of Continental defence industrial interests, whose technology rather lags behind their US counterparts. The Council proposes support for programmes on “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems” (a squeamish name for “drones” or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s) to you and me), Air-to-Air refuelling, “Satellite Communication”, and Cyber. In at least two of these areas, air-to-air refuelling and cyber (ie. GCHQ in Cheltenham), the UK is already supreme in the EU, so why should we agree to the EU directing our policy? These are all capabilities where US interoperability is essential for the UK, but there is nothing about cooperation with our closest ally, because EU defence is about excluding the US wherever possible. 

The Council “invites the Commission (again), the European Investment Bank and the European Defence Agency to develop proposals for a pooled acquisition mechanism”, which can only mean some kind of EU defence purchasing agency. It may not require much money to develop legal control over member states’ defence procurement programmes. How so? The proposals for “Strengthening Europe's defence industry” are to be “in full compliance with EU law”. This is not inter-governmental. The Commission (again) is invited “to set up a Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research”. Finally, “The European Defence Agency, in cooperation with the Commission (yet again), will prepare a roadmap for the development of defence industrial standards” and “develop a harmonized European military certification approach”. This is the key means by which the EU can obtain control over defence. One of the key purposes of Nato was to ensure transatlantic standards and certification. Here there is a lack of any reference whatsoever to EU-US cooperation. This is because the EU wants standards and certification which will exclude US defence equipment from EU markets where ever possible. That’s what EU defence policy is really all about. 

Bernard Jenkin is Conservative MP for Harwich and North Essex, Chairman of PASC, the Public Administration Select Committee and a former shadow defence secretary

Germany to Sell Israel Two Destroyers in 1 Billion Euro Deal

Germany to Sell Israel Two Destroyers in 1 Billion Euro Deal 

Arutz Sheva 07-Dec-13 

Germany is to sell two destroyers to Israel for one billion euros ($1.3 billion), the Bild daily reported Saturday. 

The torpedo-carrying war vessels will be used to protect Israeli pipelines, the paper said, without citing a source. 

The report added that Israel's national security adviser, Yossi Cohen, was in Berlin last week. 

A German government spokeswoman reached by AFP confirmed Cohen's visit but declined to elaborate. 

The deal comes amid growing tensions with Lebanon over oil and natural gas deposits in the Mediterranean. 

In the past, Lebanon has attempted to claim at least part of Israel's Tamar and Leviathan fields as its own, claiming that parts of the fields are over the international maritime border, in Lebanese waters. Lebanon has also made similar claims on gas off the shores of Cyprus. 

In September a Globes report revealed the Lebanese government has been encroaching on Israel's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), publishing tenders for offshore oil and gas exploration licenses for areas inside Israeli territorial waters.

Protests in Ukraine and Geopolitical Realities

:Protests in Ukraine and Geopolitical Realities 

Stratfor Video Transcript 06-Dec-13 

Ukraine has seen much volatility over the past week as a result of the government's decision to not move forward with key EU agreements at last week's Eastern Partnership summit. During their peak, crowds of hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of Kiev to protest against the decision and against the government in general. Officials from the EU and the U. s.said these demonstrations were a clear sign of the Ukrainian people's desire to join the West, and much of the media took these events as a sign of another Orange Revolution on the precipice. 

However, Stratfor has been more measured in its assessment of the events that have transpired in Ukraine. In fact, the decision by Ukraine to not sign the EU agreements, which took many European officials and much of the media by surprise, is something we forecast well before it happened. As such, there are a few key aspects to keep in mind in explaining why the situation in Ukraine has played out as it has and also in looking ahead to what can be expected in the future. 

The first is what would have happened if Ukraine actually had gone through with the EU agreements. In the months and weeks leading up to the decision, Russia had enacted and been threatening to enact further painful trade restrictions on Ukrainian goods if it signed the EU deals. Such a freeze on trade would have sent the Ukrainian economy, already in a delicate state, over the edge. Given Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia and the EU's inability to make up for such a shortfall, these threats were a major factor in derailing the EU agreements. 

The second is why Russia is really against Ukraine's integration with the EU. Given Ukraine's geographic location, its industrial and agricultural integration into Russia's heartland and status as a vital transit state for Russian energy to Europe, Ukraine has historically been crucial for Russia to keep in its orbit. While the EU agreements in and of themselves would not pose an existential threat to Russia, it is what they represent -- a long-term orientation of Ukraine toward the West at the expense of Russia -- that Moscow could not tolerate. In short, it was about geopolitical interests -- not ideology. 

Third is the significance of the protests. As Stratfor has written, the demonstrations have been just that -- demonstrations, not a revolution. Even at their peak, the demonstrations were largely composed of younger, Western-oriented people and opposition figures and failed to bring out broader segments of society. This explains why the protests were so big over the weekend but then substantially shrank in size during the week. 

And finally is the split nature of Ukraine. While much of the population is oriented toward the West and supports EU membership, there is also a substantial portion of the population that looks eastward and does not want to see Ukraine join the EU. This reflects cultural and political divisions in the country, as the political swings in Ukraine's chaotic post-Soviet era have shown. Had Ukraine signed the EU agreements, it is likely there would have been demonstrations against that decision as well; only those would have come from the other side of the social and political spectrum. And while Ukraine did not move forward with the EU agreements, it will show the same hesitation in making any significant moves toward integration with Russia. 

Maintaining a balance between Russia and the West is a key imperative for Ukraine. This is something very difficult to achieve, but it is this reality that frames the decision-making of any leader ruling the country.

The Next Battlegrounds for EU-Russian Competition

The Next Battlegrounds for EU-Russian Competition 

Stratfor 05-Dec-13 

Just days after Ukraine decided to freeze its integration process with the European Union, the competition between Russia and the West has shifted to two smaller but still significant states: Moldova and Georgia. On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Moldova in a show of support for the country's efforts to move closer to Europe. A day earlier, Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili said in an interview that Russia could not derail Georgia's European integration bid. 

While Kiev's failure to sign key agreements with Brussels at last week's Eastern Partnership summit and ensuing protests in Ukraine have dominated headlines, the issue overshadowed the fact that Georgia and Moldova did move forward with their own EU integration bids. During the summit, both countries initialed association and free trade agreements -- important precursors toward possible accession to the bloc -- and expressed hopes of signing the agreements by early 2014. So while the summit served as a major setback to those in Kiev and Brussels who wanted to see Ukraine strengthen ties with the bloc, it did the opposite for Georgia and Moldova. 

It is important to note that initialing such agreements is much different than signing them. While signing the EU pacts would strengthen economic, political and legal integration in lasting and practical ways, initialing is non-binding and merely signals an intention to sign the deals, with reversal possible if deemed politically necessary. Indeed, Ukraine initialed the same agreements in 2011 only to bow out before signing them a week ago. 

For Ukraine, the stakes of signing became too high. Throughout the process, officials in both Brussels and Moscow said that signing the EU agreements would be incompatible with Ukraine's parallel free trade talks with Russia through the Moscow-led Customs Union. As Ukraine moved toward the EU path, Russia selectively applied trade restrictions on Ukrainian goods and warned of worse to come if Kiev signed the EU deals. Given Ukraine's economic dependence on Russia and the precarious state of its finances, these threats proved potent enough to derail the EU agreements. 

Moldova and Georgia now find themselves in a similar situation: making significant headway toward signing the EU deals but under intensifying pressure from Russia. Moscow's tactics are similar to those it applied with Ukraine. Russia recently blocked imports of Moldovan wine, allegedly for sanitary reasons, and Russian officials have warned Chisinau that an estimated 200,000 Moldovan migrants may no longer be allowed to work in Russia due to "new regulations." Moscow has also said its recent strengthening of economic ties with the new Georgian government could be reversed if it follows through with the EU deals. 

So far, Moldova and Georgia have not changed course due to Russian pressure, and certain Western leaders are intent on supporting the countries' EU integration efforts. During his stop in Moldova, Kerry visited a winery and said Washington would help ensure that the country has a large market for its wine in the United States and Europe. Romanian President Traian Basescu recently said Bucharest and Chisinau should seek reunification once Moldova joins the European Union. Both scenarios would be highly symbolic and political, albeit not exactly practical. The West has made similar gestures recently to Georgia, including visits from U.S. and European officials. 

However, Moldova and Georgia will need more than gestures from the West if the two countries are serious about moving forward with the EU deals. Both depend on economic ties with Russia that, as with Ukraine, would be painful if severed. Both countries also have domestic political divisions, as in Ukraine, with certain segments of society opposing EU integration. Certainly, pro-EU sentiment is high in both countries but far from unanimous. The European Union is also divided over the matter, with neighboring countries such as Poland and Lithuania far more enthusiastic about Moldovan and Georgian integration than EU member states farther west, such as France and the United Kingdom. 

Meanwhile, Russia has another source of leverage in both Georgia and Moldova: breakaway territories. After the fall of the Soviet Union, separatist tensions turned into military conflicts in Moldova's Transdniestria and Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Each territory has since become financially dependent on Moscow, and each hosts a Russian military presence. As Moldova and Georgia's EU talks have intensified, Russia has signaled that it could use the breakaway regions to create problems for both countries. Indeed, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war stemmed from Tbilisi's efforts to join NATO, and Moscow views Georgia's EU integration efforts just as suspiciously. 

Thus, as it did in Ukraine, Western and Russian activity will likely intensify in Moldova and Georgia in the coming months. Though both countries currently appear committed to signing the EU agreements, the issues that prevented Ukraine from moving forward with its EU integration will weigh heavily on Chisinau and Tbilisi as well.

Noble Touts Duo Discoveries in GOM, Offshore Israel

Noble Touts Duo Discoveries in GOM, Offshore Israel 

Noble Energy Inc. 04-Dec-13 Abridged 

Noble Energy, Inc. announced Wednesday discoveries at the Dantzler exploration well in the Deepwater Gulf of Mexico and at the Tamar Southwest (SW) exploration well offshore Israel. 

The Tamar SW well, testing a new exploration prospect, encountered approximately 355 feet of net natural gas pay within the targeted Miocene intervals. Tamar SW, which was drilled to a total depth of 17,420 feet in 5,405 feet of water, is the Company's eighth consecutive discovery in the Levant Basin. The field is located approximately 8 miles southwest of the Tamar field. Evaluation of drilling data and wireline logs has confirmed the range of gross resources of the field to be between 640 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural gas and 770 Bcf. The well encountered high-quality reservoir sands, with per well productivity anticipated to be approximately 250 million cubic feet of natural gas per day. 

Noble Energy's Vice President of Exploration and Geoscience Mike Putnam commented, " In Israel, the discovery at Tamar SW further enhances our discovered resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, which now totals nearly 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The discovery also underpins our ability to meet the growing market demand in Israel and within the region." 

Following completion of operations at Tamar SW, the drilling rig will be released to another operator. Noble Energy operates Tamar SW with a 36 percent working interest. Other interest owners are Isramco Negev 2 with 28.75 percent, Delek Drilling with 15.625 percent, Avner Oil Exploration with 15.625 percent and Dor Gas Exploration with four percent.

South Stream bilateral deals breach EU law, Commission

South Stream bilateral deals breach EU law, Commission says 

EurActiv 04-Dec-13 

The bilateral agreements for the construction of the Gazprom-favoured South Stream gas pipeline – concluded between Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and Austria – are all in breach of EU law and need to be renegotiated from scratch, the European Commission said today (4 December). 

Speaking in the European Parliament, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, director for energy markets at the European Commission, said the deals were in breach of EU law. 

“The Commission has looked into these intergovernmental agreements and came to the conclusion that none of the agreements is in compliance with EU law," Borchert said. 

"That is the reason why we have told these states that they are under the obligation, either coming from the EU treaties, or from the Energy Community treaty, that they have to ask for re-negotiation with Russia, to bring the intergovernmental agreements in line with EU law,” he added. 

The development comes at a moment of heightened sensitivity in EU-Russia relations. Last week European heads of state were dismayed by the decision of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to reject the signing of a partnership agreement that would bond relations between the former Soviet state and the EU. 

Instead, Yanukovych has signalled Ukraine will bind itself closer to Russia, triggering mass protests at home in favour of closer ties with Europe. 

Russian deals out of the window 

The parliament event where Borchert spoke was attended by high-level representatives, including Russian deputy minister for energy Anatoly Yankovski, Gazprom’s director-general for export Alexander Medvedev, and Serbian energy minister Zorana Mihajlović. 

Borchert explained that if these negotiations are not successfully conducted, then these countries had to denounce their agreements with Russia. 

He explained that the EU's Energy Commissioner, Günther Oettinger, had just sent a letter to Russian energy minister Alexander Novak explaining the situation and asking him “to look positively” into the possibility of re-negotiating the deals with the countries concerned. 

These include EU members Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and Austria, as well as Serbia, which is a member of the Energy Community, an EU-backed international agreement covering former communist countries of Eastern Europe. 

“What I can say is the intergovernmental agreements will not be the basis for the construction or the operation of South Stream. Because if the member states or states concerned are not renegotiating, then the Commission has the ways and means to oblige them to do so. And South Stream cannot operate under these agreements,” Borchardt insisted. 

Three conditions 

The Commission official highlighted at least three major issues about the deals: 

    First, the EU's so-called network ownership 'unbundling' rules need to be observed, he said. This means that Gazprom, which is both a producer and a supplier of gas, cannot simultaneously own production capacity and its transmission network; 

    Secondly, non-discriminatory access of third parties to the pipeline needs to be ensured. There cannot be an exclusive right for Gazprom to be the only shipper; and 

    Thirdly, the tariff structure needed to be addressed. 

“Is it possible to bring in line the construct of South Stream and the operational part of South Stream with these rules? I don’t know. I don’t know yet ,” the official repeated. 

But even if negotiations are successful, work to accommodate South Stream with EU concerns would take time, Borchardt warned. 

“Not months, maybe two years before we get there," he said. 

Exemptions may be in the distant future 

Exemptions from unbundling obligations are not ruled out, the official said. But such a window of opportunity would open up only when gas capacities would start to be allocated to the different segments of the pipeline, he explained, adding that such a moment would take place only in the remote future. 

“It will not be an easy task; it needs a lot of mutual understanding, maybe also some new ideas that are not yet discussed. But I have to say in all openness and frankness that the South Stream pipeline will not operate on the territory of the EU if it is not in compliance of our energy law,” Borchardt stressed. 

Asked by EurActiv to reveal when the Commission had made the announcement to the EU countries concerned, Borchardt said this took place in several steps. 

First, the EU executive had asked them to send to Brussels their intergovernmental agreements which were subsequently analysed by Oettinger's services. He said he had personally chaired a meeting on 18 October, at which he also invited a Gazprom representative, and that the countries were well aware of the situation since. 

“They are fully informed of what I said today,” Borchert assured. 

'First welding' ceremonies                               

The Commission's announcement may embarrass at least two South Stream transit countries. 

Bulgaria, which opened its doors to South Stream in April 2012 under a previous government, hosted a South Stream “first welding” ceremony on 4 November, in the village of Rasovo in the Montana municipality of Bulgaria, near the border with Serbia. 

And Serbia did the same on 24 November in the village of Šajkaš, in Vojvodina. Both countries reportedly knew that they were promoting a project under agreements seen by Brussels as illegal. 

Asked about the timeframe to re-negotiate the agreements, the Commission official remained vague. The first step, he said, is for the EU countries concerned to ask for a re-opening of the intergovernmental agreements with Moscow. Borchert said the EU Executive hoped that Moscow would look at this positively. 

But Russia has apparently no intention of re-opening those deals. Speaking at the event, Gazprom’s Medvedev stressed that “nothing could prevent the construction of South Stream”. 

Borchardt replied by saying: “What the Commission would hardly accept is that you put to us a pipeline that is built, that’s in the landscape, and then handing over the baby to us and say – now it’s up to you, Commission, to find a solution how can we operate it." 

Russian deputy minister for energy Anatoly Yankovski, who delivered a prepared speech shortly afterwards, said that Russia does not accept that EU rules should apply to trans-boundary projects such as pipelines, which are not stationed solely on EU territory. 

He added that EU law could not prevail in EU-Russia relations, which are governed only by international law. In other words, the intergovernmental agreements concluded by Russia over South Stream were prevailing over other legal norms, Yankovski said.